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We review some of the major accounts in the current epistemology of modality and identify 
some shared issues that plague all of them. In order to provide insight into the nature of modal 
statements in science, philosophy, and beyond, a satisfactory epistemology of modality would 
need to be suitably applicable to practical and theoretical contexts by limited beings. 
However, many epistemologies of modality seem to work only when we have access to the 
kind of knowledge that is at least currently beyond our reach. Or, in the extreme case, it is 
argued that even if we knew all the relevant information about the respective domain – or 
even the entire state of the world – there would still remain a special class of modal truths 
that would be left unaccounted for. Neither picture bodes well for practical applicability, nor 
for the philosophical justification of these epistemologies. This is especially the case as we 
hold that one of the main motivations for modal inquiry typically arises in cases of imperfect 
information and limited cognitive resources. We close by providing a partial remedy to the 
situation by suggesting an overall framework of relative modality (RM) that can be used to 






In this paper, we review and criticize some popular approaches to the epistemology of 
modality. These include essentialism (e.g., Lowe 2012; Hale 2013), conceivability-based 
accounts (e.g., Yablo 1993; Chalmers 2002; 2010), and certain philosophical uses of the 
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framework of possible worlds (e.g., Lewis 1986; Nozick 1981, 128–137). Our treatment is by 
no means complete; there are also epistemological accounts of modality that fall outside the 
scope of our discussion, including, but not limited to, variations and combinations of the 
aforementioned positions. However, our purpose is to highlight what we see as a general 
trend amongst the standard philosophical answers to the epistemological challenge of 
modalities. We think that the approaches are far too often driven by background assumptions 
that lack adequate epistemic justification. As a result, instead of giving us tools to tackle 
puzzling cases of modalities in science, philosophy or ordinary life, these theories rather lead 
to further philosophical problems. In a nutshell, they tend to either explain our modal access 
by positing explanantia that are themselves epistemically highly problematic or, failing to or 
not attempting to explain our modal access, they lead to forms of modal skepticism.  
We think this situation is problematic for many reasons, chief among them the fact that 
modalities are an integral part of our scientific and everyday reasoning. Ideally, we would like 
to see an epistemological theory of modalities that is at once without obvious philosophical 
problems and can do justice to our actual epistemic practices. Indeed, the existing accounts 
of modality seem to be in stark tension with the pragmatic rationale behind modal reasoning. 
Moreover, since modal language is often invoked in the context of limited knowledge (e.g., 
Dray 1957, 165; Wimsatt 2007, 130–131), it would be good if our epistemological theory could 
also say something about these situations. That is, something other than that they are all 
unjustified. Surely some of these modal claims are still epistemically more (or less) warranted 
than others? 
After reviewing the standard answers in the epistemology of modality, we close with a 
short account of our own that should provide a partial remedy to the situation. More precisely, 
we sketch an overall framework of relative modality (RM) that can be used to unify some 
existing modal epistemologies and, at the same time, make them more metaphysically 
modest.1 RM is concerned about what is kept fixed in publicly evaluable systems, scenarios, 
models, theories, and other vehicles of inference-making (for a precursor of this kind of view, 
see Quine 1982). The epistemology of modal statements thus becomes an internal question 
of the features and boundary conditions imposed by the system in question. These system 
features are then typically justified externally through experiments, manipulations, and so on. 
 
1 For a more comprehensive account of the proposed epistemology of modality, see Hirvonen, Koskinen and 
Pättiniemi (forthcoming). 
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In certain contexts, they may even be simply stipulated. Our picture complements a parallel 
line of argumentation developed recently by Fischer (see Fischer 2016; 2017). However, 
contrary to Fischer’s Theory-Based Epistemology of Modality (TEM), our view does not impose 
strong veridicality conditions or elements of accompanying mental models in modal 
justification. RM is also very flexible because its basic principles can be applied without much 
modification to science, philosophy and ordinary cases of modal reasoning. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we introduce the problem 
of epistemic modal access. The following three sections then review and criticize the standard 
answers to this challenge. Section 3 focuses on essentialism, while Section 4 investigates 
conceivability-based accounts. In Section 5, we discuss some basic features of the framework 
of possible worlds and argue that they are often misapplied to give a false sense of epistemic 
justification for modal claims. Building on these criticisms, we then discuss the overall 
situation and provide our partial answer by introducing the relative modality (RM) framework 
in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Epistemologies of Modality: Gaining Access 
 
Central among the questions about modal statements are the following: (i) are there modal 
facts or truths?, and (ii) if there are, how do we come to know, or gain access, to them? The 
second of these questions will be our primary concern here – the epistemology of modality. 
But we will also say something about (i), since if there are no modal facts, the epistemology 
of modality will be rather useless. 
In his book Modality (2003), Joseph Melia gives the following argument for the 
indispensability of modal facts. Let us assume that we have a theory of the world that contains 
only and all facts about the state of every object, past, present, and future (Melia 2003, 1). It 
might state, say, that the chair at the southwest corner of an attic weighs exactly 5.6735 kg, 
and that ten years hence it will be in the basement instead of the attic. Both these statements 
will be true. But does this theory contain all truths? Melia does not think so. It would 
encompass truths about epistemic modalities, but other kinds will be left out; namely, truths 
“that go beyond the merely actual and tell us something about how things might be, or must 
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be, or would be had things been other than they actually are” (Melia 2003, 3). Indeed, the 
theory will not contain any informative facts about possibilities, necessities, counterfactuals, 
and so on. Here we are led to quite a strong version of modal skepticism. Nevertheless, it is 
worth asking: would there even be any need for modalities under Melia’s scenario? We are 
not convinced that there would be. To see this, let us take a look at the indispensability of 
modal statements. 
So, do we really need modal statements for anything? Indeed, we do. They allow for 
prediction and control and assignment of causes and culpability. What, after all, is prediction 
if not the determination of possible (or necessary, if we are lucky!) future states of a system? 
And control is just prediction combined with an intervention aiming at serving our goals. As 
an illustration, we will briefly consider a timely example from the science of climate models.  
A climate model is basically a set of equations that characterize the dynamical and 
thermodynamical processes in the atmosphere and the oceans, with a set of initial conditions 
and parameters that characterize the state of the atmosphere and the oceans, and of differing 
‘drivers’ of climate change, such as forcing caused by the increase of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere (Neelin 2011, chs. 3 & 7).2 Such models are built to facilitate a better 
understanding of the Earth’s climate and of climate change. Climate models allow us to 
determine the causes of, say, past and present warming events and to compare the 
differences in the drivers of such events. This is accomplished through a counterfactual 
analysis; what would have had to have been different to cause a different outcome? 3 The 
models can also be used to predict, or make projections, of future climate, given differing 
interventions on factors such as greenhouse gas production. Indeed, the most interesting 
output from climate models is not what will happen if things stay as they are now, but how 
things can be if we change the current situation. That is, (1) what are the possible future states 
of the climate, and (2) how can we bring these about? (Meehl et al. 2007; Neelin 2011, ch. 7.) 
In other words, climate models tell us not just how things are, but why they are as they are 
(the causes of climate change) and, further, they allow us to predict and, hopefully, to control 
the climate. Therefore, climate models are modal in an interesting and indispensable way.  
 
2 Also, many processes, such as cloud formation, will be added as parameters due to their complexity. The whole 
nature of climate models need not concern us here, but for those wishing to learn more, Houghton (2005), in 
addition to Neelin’s book (2011), is a good starting point. 
3 This is not to say that a counterfactual analysis of the metaphysics of causation is necessarily correct, but rather 
that we need it to pick out causes in our systems of interest.  
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The example of climate models illustrates a more general pattern across science and in 
more ordinary matters: modal statements are indispensable. Their indispensability comes 
from the fact that we do not have Melia’s grand theory; that is, we are not all -knowing. An 
all-knowing being would have no need to know whether something will happen out of 
necessity or only contingently: it simply will happen. The same holds for counterfactuals, 
causes, culpability, and so on. The theory will tell us what has happened, what is happening, 
and what will happen, even our (futile) attempts to change events. A world with such a theory 
will be a necessitarian one.4 Because of this, Melia is wrong in thinking that such a theory 
would leave something out: it would not. However, we have good reasons to think that such 
a theory is not to be had. For us limited beings, modalities are not a thing to be excised from 
a mature science, but rather the very point of science. They are that which allows for 
explanation, understanding, control, and prediction. Scientific theories are modal to their 
core. Now we get to our main question: given that modal statements are needed, do we then 
know any modal facts? And even more importantly, how do we gain access to them? 
Current epistemologies of modality are often built up from metaphysical theories 
concerning modalities. They try to get from what modalities are, in some metaphysical sense, 
to how we come to have knowledge of them. We take this to be quite wrong-headed, 
especially given that we do not have an agreed-upon epistemology of metaphysics. Moreover, 
if we cannot know the correct metaphysics, we can hardly use it to find out about modalities. 
So, we take that an epistemology of modality has to start epistemology first.  
There have, fortunately, been approaches that respect an epistemology first approach. 
Examples include Bob Fischer’s (2016; 2017) Theory-Based Epistemology of Modality (TEM), 
and Sonia Roca-Royes’ (2017) approach that reasons from actuality and similarity to 
possibility, at least in the case of de re possibilities. According to these approaches, one way 
of gaining (ampliative) modal knowledge is through what actually is the case, combined with 
manipulation and reasoning from similarity. A second way is based on what we call relative 
modality (RM): for any system, modal claims are evaluated relative to said system. The 
simplest case will be using classical logic. Simply put, if a claim leads to a contradiction, it will 
 
4 Is this saying too much since one cannot reason from actuality to necessity? The problem that omniscience 
brings is that if one knows the future state of a system, then that state will occur; otherwise, one would not have 
known it. Whether one chooses to call this “necessary” will be a matter of taste. Formally it seems to bear all 
the hallmarks of necessity. A world with Melia’s grand theory will be practically indistinguishable from a 
necessitarian one. 
Ilkka Pättiniemi, Rami Koskinen, and Ilmari Hirvonen 
 
be impossible (relative to the system); if a claim does not lead to a contradiction, it will be 
possible; if the negation of a claim leads to a contradiction, the claim will be necessary. 
If the kind of epistemology characterized above is viable, it goes a long way to show that 
in the context of science and everyday matters, a metaphysically based epistemology of 
modality is unnecessary. Further, it seems that many such metaphysical theories can be taken 
to be instances of relative modality, where the systems in question are not always well 




3. Essentialism and Counterfactuals 
 
The most well-known essentialist accounts of modal knowledge come from E.J. Lowe (2012) 
and Bob Hale (2013). According to Lowe, our knowledge of (metaphysical) modality is based 
on our ability to grasp the essences of entities. These essences can be expressed through real 
definitions, and essence is simply what the entity in question is. “Grasping” the essence of 
something is to understand what that thing’s real definition is. (Lowe 2012.) 
Hale’s story of modal knowledge is quite similar to Lowe’s. He also starts from the 
essences of entities and their real definitions (Hale 2013, 133n, 254). Some real definitions can 
be known a priori. Such cases include analytic truths, like “a cob is a male swan”, and our 
explicit grasping of some relevant concept like “a natural number” or “a square”. (id., 255–
256.) This a priori way of knowing essences is familiar to us already from Lowe’s view. Some 
essences, however, are not accessible to us a priori through mere conceptual reflection. In 
these situations, essences are known via empirical investigation together with general 
essentialist principles, such as “any object is essentially an object of a certain general kind” 
(id., 259–260, 270). Given our empirical knowledge and knowledge of the general principles, 
we can obtain knowledge of facts concerning essences covered by the general principles (id., 
269). However, in a posteriori cases our knowledge of essences might remain incomplete: 
perhaps we have not yet been able to figure out all essential facts of an entity but only a subset 
of them (Vaidya 2018, 235). 
The problem here is that the essentialist move merely changes the epistemology of 
modality to the epistemology of essences. This way of passing the buck does not appear to 
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present a satisfactory answer to our conundrum, for there seems to be less agreement about 
what properties are essential compared to what sort of claims are necessary. Lowe (2012, 
940) even explicitly admits that “philosophers can have honest disagreements about 
questions of essence.” Moreover, he also states that sometimes we do not fully adequately 
grasp the essences of things that we are thinking (ibid.). 
However, it seems that we can know necessary modal truths without knowing their 
essences. Consider, for instance, the ellipse. According to Lowe, even though an ellipse can be 
defined as a type of conic section, such a definition would not capture its essential features. 
Among the reasons that Lowe offers for the conclusion is that cones cannot be essential for 
ellipses since ellipses can exist without cones. (Lowe 2012.) Irrespective of whether Lowe is 
right about this, there seems to be something wrong with his reasoning. After all, we can infer 
all of an ellipse’s properties from the cone-section definition, even those that Lowe considers 
essential. Thus, if someone does not know the real definition of an ellipse, she can 
nevertheless deduce the same necessary truths from this non-essential definition as from the 
real one. To take stock, knowledge of essences is not required for inferring modal knowledge, 
and there are “honest disagreements” about which properties are essential. Thus, we can 
know necessary truths even if we do not know the essences of things.  
Hale’s situation is similar to Lowe’s. Besides the fact that we might not need the real 
definitions of entities to have modal knowledge, Hale’s account also requires knowledge of 
general essentialist principles for a posteriori knowledge of essences. It appears to be 
relatively safe to assume that at this point, there is no agreement about what those principles 
should be, since there is no agreement among philosophers whether essences exist in the first 
place. And still, we do seem to agree about modal claims and have modal knowledge.  
The situation is similar in the case of Williamson’s counterfactual account of modal 
knowledge. Williamson’s conception of the epistemology of modality is founded on our ability 
to evaluate counterfactual conditionals in our imagination while keeping some “constitutive 
facts” fixed (Williamson 2007, 164, 170). Even though Williamson does not discuss essences 
but “constitutive facts”, in practice, the constitutive facts play the same role as Lowe’s or 
Hale’s essences. In addition, Williamson does not give a detailed account of how we get to 
know which facts are constitutive (Roca-Royes 2011; Fischer 2016). Still, he does say 
something about which things should be kept fixed when we are talking about nomic 
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modalities: what is necessary, possible, and so on, according to the laws of nature under 
specific circumstances (Williamson 2016).  
In Williamson’s view, nomic modality requires that the laws of nature – which are 
discovered abductively – are kept fixed along with “all true claims of identity and distinctness” 
and “true claims of kind membership and non-membership” (Williamson 2016, 463). But this, 
in his mind, would already force us to the domain of metaphysical modality. Claims like 
“Hesperus is Phosphorus” and “Hesperus is not a quark” are not something that natural laws 
can tell us (ibid.). Hence, Williamson claims, metaphysical modalities are needed to make 
nomic modalities consistent to avoid blatant inconsistencies like “Hesperus is not Phosphorus” 
or, by the same token, “Hesperus is not Hesperus” (ibid.). 
The problem with Williamson’s approach is that for nomic modality, the relevant claims 
of identity and kinds are either already fixed through similar scientific research as the laws of 
nature or it is not clear how the additional claims should be fixed. This presents us with two 
options. On the one hand, either nomic or natural modality does not require additional 
metaphysical information besides the ontological commitments that scientists have already 
made. On the other hand, we need a separate epistemology for the metaphysical claims, and 
there does not appear to be agreement about what that epistemology should be like. 
However, it seems evident that the first option is right: we have adequate ways of evaluating 
natural modalities based on scientific research. Indeed, Williamson’s troubles look very similar 
to those that Lowe and Hale have to face. 
 
 
4. Conceivability as the Modalist’s Guide 
 
Deriving metaphysical possibility from conceivability has an illustrious history. Among the 
famed defenders of this line of thinking is no lesser a figure than David Hume:  
 
“‘Tis an establish’d maxim in metaphysics, that whatever the mind clearly conceives 
includes the idea of possible existence, or in other words, that nothing we imagine is 
absolutely impossible. We can form the idea of a golden mountain, and from thence 
conclude that such a mountain may actually exist. We can form no idea of a mountain 
without a valley, and therefore regard it as impossible.” (Treatise, I, ii, 2) 




However, we will concentrate on newer proponents of the “conceivability entails possibility” 
principle, namely Stephen Yablo (1993) and David Chalmers (2002; 2010). Still, the remarks 
made here will also apply to more classic defenders of the principle such as Hume and, 
arguably, Descartes. 
According to Yablo (1993, 29), p is conceivable for a subject S if S can imagine a world 
that S takes to verify p. And, respectively, p is inconceivable to S if S cannot imagine any world 
that S does not take to falsify p. Chalmers’ conception of conceivability shares much with 
Yablo’s account, but he makes additional requirements on the capabilities of the subject S. Or 
more specifically on the type of conceivability, but it turns out that this, in turn, requires much 
from S, more indeed than can be expected from limited cognitive beings. 
Like Yablo, Chalmers divides conceivability into several different types, two of which 
pretty much coincide with Yablo’s conceptions and thus are amenable to the same treatment. 
Unfortunately, the rest are rather technical, and their full explication would take up more 
space than the present work allows for. What we can say, however, is that the remaining types 
of conceivability call for “ideal rational reflection” (Chalmers 2010, 143) and thus for ideal 
rational reflectors; these, in turn, seem to be in a rather short supply. 
In Chalmers’ parlance, positive conceivability means that a subject can imagine a 
situation where p would hold. On the other hand, negative conceivability means that a subject 
does not find a contradiction in a situation where p would hold. (Chalmers 2010, 144.) 
Chalmers also makes a distinction between prima facie and ideal conceivability. Roughly, 
prima facie conceivability is something that limited beings can conceive, whereas ideal 
conceivability requires ideal rational reflection. (Chalmers 2002, 147; 2010, 143.) As an 
example, squaring the circle was, at least, negatively prima facie conceivable because those 
who tried to achieve it did not see a contradiction in the endeavor. But it is not ideally 
conceivable because squaring the circle is impossible with a finite number of operations. 
Last but not least, Chalmers separates primary conceivability from secondary 
conceivability (Chalmers 2002, 157; 2010, 146). This distinction is based on his version of two-
dimensional semantics. Primary conceivability is connected to a proposition’s primary 
intension and the secondary conceivability to its secondary intension. This is best illustrated 
with an example. Take the question: “Could it have turned out that water is not H2O?” If one 
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considers the primary intension of the question, then the answer is yes. One can imagine a 
scenario where it would have turned out that the “watery stuff” in the actual world was 
something other than H2O, say, XYZ. However, from the perspective of the secondary 
intension this is impossible because the term ‘water’ refers to H2O in all counterfactual 
situations, given that water is necessarily H2O. Since we cannot know a priori that water is 
H2O, it is in some sense – the primary sense – conceivable that water is not H2O. Still, in 
another sense, due to Kripkean a posteriori necessities, it is inconceivable that water would 
not be H2O. After all, if water is necessarily H2O, then water is H2O in all possible worlds. 
(Chalmers 1996, 57–59; 2002, 157; 2010, 146; Vaidya 2015; Feng 2017, 21–23.) 
However, here the question arises of why we should use either Yablo’s or Chalmers’ 
approach. Presumably, one would not use either method to find out about, say, physical or 
mathematical possibilities. Let us return to squaring the circle as a simple example to illustrate 
this.  
For centuries mathematicians tried to find a method for squaring the circle, that is, 
transforming a circle into a square of an equal area through finite steps using only a compass 
and a ruler. Clearly, these mathematicians did not consider their task impossible or 
inconceivable, for if they had, they doubtless would have discontinued their efforts.5 But, as it 
turns out, squaring the circle is impossible. (Schubert 1891.) This seems to imply that all of 
those mathematicians who tried to accomplish it, and thought they had conceived of it, were 
mistaken. Hence, one can err in taking something to be conceivable. Note that there are 
external, intersubjectively evaluable criteria for determining whether a circle can actually be 
squared. Now, we are left with two options: (1) Claim that the mathematicians who tried to 
square the circle had not, in fact, conceived of squaring the circle. They merely thought they 
had. So, then, the problem will be knowing when one has indeed conceived of something. If 
external, intersubjective criteria are lacking, this task seems impossible to undertake; there 
will be no intersubjective way of justifying whether one has indeed conceived of something 
or merely thinks that one has. (2) Claim that the mathematicians had conceived of squaring 
the circle, but the task just happens to be impossible. Then the link from conceivability to 
 
5 Descartes famously distinguished conceivability for imaginability when he pointed out that imagining the 
difference between a thousand-sided and a thousand-and-one-sided polygon would be quite difficult if not 
impossible. Still, as Descartes points out, it clearly is possible to make a conceptual distinction between the two, 
and thus, their difference is nevertheless conceivable. (Descartes 1984, 50–51.) 
Epistemology of Modality 
 
 
possibility will be severed. Therefore, the conceivability-to-possibility principle is either 
incorrect or limited in its scope because it requires less limited beings than mere humans.6 If 
the principle is not reliable in mathematics, why would we take it to be reliable in a field where 
justification is even harder to come by, namely metaphysics?  
Furthermore, Peter van Inwagen (1998) has argued that if conceivability is a guide to 
possibility, then we need to conceive all the required steps for really conceiving the thing. His 
examples are transparent iron and purple cows. If someone indeed claims that these things 
are (metaphysically) possible because they are conceivable, then they should actually 
conceive the things in question on the physical and chemical levels. That is, what things in the 
DNA of the cow make its color possible, or what in the structure of the iron could make it 
transparent. Similarly, what steps are required in squaring the circle. If one really considers it 
conceivable, one should conceive all the appropriate steps needed for the squaring. But this 
would entail actually squaring the circle or giving a mathematical proof of its possibility. What 
role would be left for conceivability? 
 
 
5. Possible Worlds 
 
The last philosophical approach to the epistemology of modality that we examine concerns 
the logico-semantic framework of possible worlds. This is not so much a specific epistemic 
theory, but more of an amalgamation of approaches and strategies that refer to a common 
formalism. The most classical account of modality in terms of logic is through the idea of non-
contradictoriness: possible propositions consist simply of all those things that can be asserted 
without contradiction. Necessities, in turn, are such that their denial would lead to a 
 
6 In an unpublished manuscript, “The Unsoundness of Arguments From Conceivability”, Andrew Bailey has 
presented this very same argument, namely, that as cognitively limited creatures, we are unable to determine 
whether something is ideally conceivable or not. Chalmers has responded to him by citing instances of clearly 
prima facie conceivable or inconceivable things that are also ideally conceivable or inconceivable: “Although we 
are non-ideal, we can know that it is not ideally conceivable that 0=1 and that it is ideally conceivable that 
someone exists. We know that certain things about the world (say, that all philosophers are philosophers) are 
knowable a priori and that certain things about the world (say, that there is a table in this room) are not so 
knowable even by an ideal reasoner.” (Chalmers 2010, 155.) However, even if we can know that 0=1 is not ideally 
conceivable, that does not yet, in itself, give us good reason to think that some metaphysical ideas (such as 
philosophical zombies) are ideally conceivable. Perhaps such ideas are more alike with squaring the circle: they 
seem conceivable even if they are not. 
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contradiction, and so on. However, this classical logical treatment of modality is ambiguous 
because it, in a crucial way, depends on the domain of investigation and how it is being 
represented. In order to apply classical logic to any material modalities, choices have to be 
made as to how to interpret and formalize them, what to include in the domain of the logical 
calculus, and so on. 
In contemporary philosophy, modalities are typically investigated in specially devised 
modal logics of which there are many axiomatizations. The reigning semantics for these formal 
systems is provided by the framework of possible worlds (e.g., Kripke 1959; see also Hintikka 
1957). Assessment of possibility and necessity is made based on a set of worlds (typically sets 
of propositions) and accessibility relations between the worlds. So, for example, if Tuomas 
happens to find himself in a situation where it is raining, the proposition that it is possible for 
Tuomas to be in a situation where it is not raining is dependent on a few things. Let us say that 
in our scenario, Tuomas is in a world w. Then, for the alternative possibility to hold, there 
needs to be another world, call it w’, in which (i) it is not raining and (ii) it is accessible from 
w. Furthermore, we would also like to know that the identity of Tuomas stays the same across 
these two worlds. 
Possible world semantics provides a powerful tool to tackle modal scenarios of various 
kinds in philosophy and elsewhere. Some philosophers also use possible worlds as a 
metaphysical theory, the locus classicus being Lewis’ theory of modal realism (Lewis 1986). 
However, what is noteworthy is that all the aforementioned basic facts that are required for 
the complete assessment of modal statements need to be stipulated on a case-by-case basis. 
Thus, even though it provides a richer representational framework for various purposes, 
possible worlds semantics does not really go any further than classical predicate logic to 
explain or ground modalities. All the epistemologically crucial steps happen when the 
particular stipulations are being made.  
What does this mean in practice? Let us look at an example. Typically, possible worlds 
are evoked to explain why one alternative state of affairs is philosophically more plausible 
than others. This is manifested in the way philosophers speak about “close” or “nearby” 
possible worlds. Elaborate arguments are invoked in the context of the analysis of knowledge, 
for example, where various modal conditions are applied to determine what kind of changes 
to our actual circumstances we should regard as epistemically relevant (e.g., Nozick 1981, 
172–178; Pritchard 2005, ch. 6). Using the framework of possible worlds, philosophers can 
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thus sometimes rule out certain scenarios as far-fetched or irrelevant in the context of their 
argument. The basic idea here is often quite intuitive. For example, the scenario in which 
unicorns exist is closer to the actual world than the scenario where both unicorns and centaurs 
exist. This seems to be valid logical reasoning based on the properties of the conjunction 
connective. But what if we simply compared worlds in which unicorns exist and worlds in 
which centaurs exist. Which of these possible worlds is closer to the actual world? What is the 
metric used here, and how could it be justified?  
The problem is, unfortunately, that it is precisely the questions of the metric that is often 
not explicated in philosophical arguments that refer to the closeness of possible worlds (e.g., 
Nozick 1981, 172–178; Pritchard 2005, ch. 6). Notice that we are not implying that a sensible 
metric is not to be had in these kinds of situations, but instead that there are likely to be 
multiple (formally definable) metrics that could be used in the context of possible worlds 
semantics. Here, it is the very choice of the particular metric that is doing the heavy lifting, not 
the semantic framework of possible worlds itself. However, as in the case of sciences more 
generally, no model or representation can justify its utility in isolation from its purpose and 
application. Thus, possible worlds seem to face similar challenges as the two previous routes 





We have argued that all of the above theories face epistemological challenges individually. 
However, we have not yet considered whether they (and further variations based on them) 
can also conflict with each other. This is clearly a problem since they aim to describe the 
correct set of modal facts and our epistemic access to them. Interestingly, however, their 
possible agreement could also be seen as a problem. For then, the question arises concerning 
what makes any particular theory of modality special. If a conceivability-based theory of 
modality gives all the same answers as a counterfactual one, which of these is doing the 
grounding of our epistemic access? It is also considerations like this that urge us to move more 
towards the justification of these systems as a whole. 
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It behooves us now to give a more detailed account of relative modality (RM). Recall 
from section 2 that according to RM, modal claims are evaluated relative to a system. At its 
simplest, this will be done through classical logic, where statements are possible if they do 
not lead to a contradiction with the system, necessary if their negation leads to a 
contradiction, and so on. So, what RM allows for is  good reasoning about modal claims 
relative to a given system. What it does not give are criteria for the choice of a system.  
At first blush, relative modality would appear to offer a friendly ground for metaphysical 
modality. After all, we can evaluate the modal claims of any metaphysical system using RM. 
But here the modal knowledge gained is only knowledge about a system. If the goal of 
metaphysics is to say something about the world, then such knowledge is otiose unless one 
can show that the system is a good match for reality. Of course, one can construct a system 
of rules as one sees fit. It is possible to build a system (or theory, model etc.) that does not 
correspond to reality. So a system can be based on, say, what kinds of rules individuals find 
amusing, as is the case with games like chess, or on the intuitions of individual thinkers.  
Problems arise when one claims that their system describes how things are in the real 
world. How are we to evaluate whether such a system is any good as a description? One can 
do this in science by checking whether the predictions of the system match our empirical 
findings. But this only tells us about natural or empirical modalities. Insofar as empirical 
testing of certain claims is not possible, how can one check whether the system in question 
tells us anything about the real world? Hence, one faces the challenge of how to make modal 
claims non-arbitrary. We claim that one is not justified in accepting the claims until this 
challenge is met. 
There is another problem if metaphysical modality is understood through relative 
modality. Which metaphysical claims should one fix? According to our relative modality 
account, metaphysical modalities are founded upon fixing certain claims – claims like 
Hesperus is Phosphorus, gold is the element with the atomic number 79, cats are animals, 
Elizabeth II is the daughter of George VI, water is H2O, and so on. These claims, as themselves, 
are not yet modal claims. Nevertheless, their fixation as a part of a system is what makes them 
necessary. But why should these specific statements be fixed as axioms of our ontological 
system? Why can they not merely correspond to, say, a particular state of play in chess, a 
certain arrangement of pieces on the board? Why do they instead have to be analogical to 
the rules of chess?  
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Kripke, for instance, has argued that the special metaphysical status of these statements 
comes from the fact that their parts refer to the same entities or substances in all possible 
worlds. In other words, they are rigid designators. (Kripke 1980.) Indeed, they refer to the 
same target in the actual world, but to say that they refer to the same target in all possible 
worlds is to merely state – from the point of view of relative modality – that this is something 
we should keep fixed. It does not tell us why we should do so. Now, Kripke offers several 
thought experiments to prove his point. This is all fine, but do not these thought experiments 
only tell us that we intuitively keep certain things fixed or that we keep them fixed for other 
than metaphysical reasons, like physical or historical reasons? Thus, the justification for their 
special metaphysical status remains still unclear. 
Now, we are in a position to see that both Lowe’s and Hale’s essentialist accounts are 
based on RM. The basic idea behind them is that entities have essentialist properties that are 
kept fixed. Furthermore, from our knowledge of essences, we can deduce necessary truths. 
After all, as Lowe states, “any essential truth is ipso facto a metaphysically necessary truth” 
(Lowe 2012, 938 italics in original). So, here, (metaphysically) necessary truths are derived 
from the essential properties of our target of inquiry. From these necessary truths, further 
modal truths can be deduced. If X does not contradict any necessary statement, then X is 
possible. If X does contradict such statements, then it is impossible, and so on. But this is 
precisely the way RM deals with modal inferences, only here the system is fixed to be the 
essential features of the target, or domain, of inquiry. But, as stressed above, why choose 
either of these systems? The interesting epistemological question is not “what is 
possible/necessary given a system?” but rather “how to choose a system in which to evaluate 
modal claims?”. Lowe and Hale do not answer this latter question. Thus, given that the 
machinery through which modal inferences are made is RM and that it is not clear which, if 
any, claims concerning essences are justified, this essentialist route to modal knowledge is 
questionable at best.  
Similar reasoning holds for both Yablo’s and Chalmers’ use of the conceivability-to-
possibility principle. That is, they are both based on relative modality. Again, possibility is 
relativized to an individual’s ability either to imagine scenarios or infer contradictions. In 
either case, there is a system, although not one explicitly spelled out, in relation to which a 
proposition is considered to be possible. And again, Yablo and Chalmers seem to have very 
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little in the way of justification for their preferred system. This, again, leaves Yablo’s and 
Chalmers’ approaches questionable.  
The above was not an argument for the falsity of any or all metaphysical modal claims. 
So, we are not saying that metaphysicians advancing metaphysical claims are mistaken. We 
have merely argued that, at least thus far, they do not have a good justification for such 
claims. 
As a final note, are we not guilty of moving the interesting epistemic questions from the 
modal claims onto the choice of a system? Indeed we are, but this does not have to be a bad 
thing. For, insofar as we can justify our choice of a system, we will at the same time gain a 
way of justifying modal claims. So, when is a choice of a system justified? In the case of, say, 
scientific models and theories, they are justified by empirical corroboration, consistency with 
other theories, and so on. In other cases, like the rules of chess, such external justification is 
not needed. But subjecting our justification of a system to ampliative reasoning will make 
claims based on RM epistemic, at least in some sense. Here lies a risk that we will end up 
having provided an epistemology only for epistemic – and thus subjective – modalities. First, 
imagining, conceiving and appeals to intuition are also subjective in nature. So, these ways of 
justifying a system or a claim will be subjective. Second, justification of scientific, 
mathematical and logical theories is done in an intersubjective way. Reasons, results, 
inferences, and so on, have to be presented in a way that is accessible to others for the 





We have criticized some popular approaches to the problem of epistemic access to modal 
knowledge. These included essentialism, conceivability-based accounts, counterfactual 
reasoning, and the use of possible worlds as an epistemic grounding of modal claims. We 
argued that all of these epistemologies seem to work only when we have access to the kind 
of knowledge that considerably surpasses what can be expected from our scientific, yet 
piecemeal and cognitively limited, accounts of the world. They then solve this situation 
through strong metaphysical assumptions or succumb to modal skepticism. Thus, instead of 
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guiding our modal access, they lead us astray or function as overly officious gatekeepers. This, 
to us, is untenable. 
We argued that some of these worries could be eased if we adopt the framework of 
relative modality (RM). RM is concerned with what is kept fixed in publicly-evaluable systems 
of modal inquiry. The epistemology of modal statements thus becomes an internal question 
of the features and boundary conditions imposed by the system in question. These system 
features are then typically justified externally through experiments, manipulations, 
theoretical derivations, or they may even be stipulated. The primary motivation behind this 
move is not to rule out any particular theory of modalities but rather to make the 
epistemology of modality methodologically honest. 
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